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2013, Issue 3 (19). Abstracts



E.V. Zhelobodko,
NRU-HSE (Moscow); IM SB RAS, NSU, Novosibirsk, Russia

A.V. Sidorov, NRU-HSE (Moscow); IM SB RAS, NSU, Novosibirsk, Russia

J.-F. Thisse, NRU-Higher School of Economics, Moscow; CORE; Universite catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Monopolistic Competition vs Oligopoly in the "Large Economy": How Much Is Difference?

The paper studies a market of horizontally differentiated good under increasing return to scale and exogenous number of firms. Three concepts of equilibria are compared: Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competition. Under fairly general assumptions on consumer’s preferences, it is shown that Lerner index is the highest in Cournot case, monopolistic competition provides the lowest one and Bertrand equilibrium takes intermediate position. When the number of firms N increases, both oligopolistic equilibria converge to monopolistic competitive equilibrium with rate 1/ N . Thus the study generalizes the similar results on markets of homogeneous goods.

Key words: monopolistic competition, oligopoly, differentiated goods, market power, Lerner index
JEL classification: D43, D41, F12, L13



S.M. Ivashchenko
, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics RAS, St. Petersburg, Russia

Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model with Banks and Endogenous Defaults of Firms

A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous defaults of firms has been developed. Proposed mechanism of defaults is very flexible. It takes into account an amount of assets owned by firms. It suggests that banks receive some payment from firm after default. The model is estimated for the USA and Russia.

Key words: DSGE; endogenous defaults of firms
JEL classification: E32, E43, E44, E47, G21



A.V. Isakov
, NRU HSE, Bank of Russia, Moscow, Russia

Interbank Market Structure and Accurate Estimation of an Aggregate Liquidity Shock

It’s customary among money market analysts to blame interest rate deviations from the Bank of Russia’s target band on the market structure imperfections or segmentation. We isolate one form of such market imperfection and provide an illustration of its potential impact on central bank’s open market operations efficiency in the current monetary policy framework. We then hypothesize that naive (market) structure-agnostic liquidity gap aggregation will lead to market demand underestimation in some conditions and provide an empirical backing for it.

Key words: money market, monetary policy, market segmentation, open market operations
JEL classification: C81, C82, C87, G19



A.V. Leonidov
, LPI RAS, MIPT, ITEP, Moscow, Russia

E.L. Rumyantsev, Bank of Russia, MIPT, Moscow, Russia

Russian Interbank Systemic Risks Assessment from the Network Topology Point of View

The authors study the structure of interbank unsecured loans market from the network topology point of view as well as systemic risks related to sufficiency of bank capital. The paper discusses both theoretical and practical aspects of the interbank credit market analysis.

Key words: interbank market, systemic risk, contagion, network
JEL classification: D85, D47, D53



O.V. Buklemishev
, Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Yu.A. Danilov, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Effective Financial Regulation and Creation of the Mega-Regulator in Russia

The subject of the article is creation of the effective system of financial regulation, most fitting to the needs of economic development of Russia and the structural characteristics of the domestic financial market. Having analyzed international experience to-date with integrated financial regulation, the authors formulate the basic conditions for introduction of mega-regulator in Russia. Its alternative institutional designs, their advantages and flaws are described. The conclusion is made that the scheme currently adopted in Russia with Central Bank as a mega-regulator is suboptimal.

Key words: financial regulation, mega-regulator, financial conglomerates, banking sector, non-bank financial institutes, investor protection, systemic risks
JEL classification: G28, G23, G01, K22, L51, D02



I.G. Dezhina
, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Yu.V. Simachev, Interdepartmental Analytical Center, Moscow, Russia

Matching Grants for Stimulating Partnerships between Companies and Universities in Innovation Area: Initial Effects in Russia

The paper focuses on the analysis of a new government instrument to foster the development of university-industry links by awarding matching grants to companies with obligation to outsource R&D to universities. The objectives of the study included analysis of motivation for cooperation both from side of universities and companies; primary effects and side-effects of matching grants. The research results are based on 40 in-depth interviews conducted in 2011–2012 with representatives of companies and universities. Our findings show that major motivations from side of universities were possibility to get valuable research tasks from companies, selection of most competitive teams of researchers who may work with companies, and strengthening reputation in business environment. Companies were interested in getting government funding in order to solve their technological problems; to strengthen, due cooperation with universities, their research capacity, and to use modern research infrastructure located at universities. The major effects of the matching grants include but are not limited to strengthening of university orientation towards solving practical tasks which are of interest to business; institutionalization of relations between universities and business in the innovation sphere, broadening of research cooperation; harmonization of research and educational activity in universities.

Key words: science-technology policy, research and development, innovations, matching grants, university-industry linkages
JEL classification: D22, H25, I23, O31




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